Abstract
How do drafters leverage public consultation during constitution-making? Research focuses on participation’s downstream effects, sidestepping elite deliberations where the will of “the people” takes shape. I argue that drafters engage in cherry-picking, selectively invoking consultation inputs and procedures to elevate supportive and discredit contrary evidence. Through this mode of representative claim-making, these elites do not transmit citizen preferences but characterize them to fit their constitutional positions. Using an LLM-assisted pipeline, I classify consultation invocations in plenary transcripts from Chile (2021–22) and Cuba (2018–19), identifying two modes distinguished by interpretive control of the consultation record. In Chile’s contested mode, the supermajority used consultation to underwrite reforms while the opposition attacked its design. In Cuba’s concentrated mode, the Drafting Commission used consultation to validate leadership decisions while other deputies celebrated the process. Cherry-picking makes visible what constituent power theory conceals — that drafters represent a public whose will they partly construct.